Breaking the Dam: How India Can Abrogate the Indus Waters Treaty

2 May 2025 Akshat Dwivedi

International relations are governed not by sentiment but by the cold calculus of power, survival, and national interest. Under the Realist prism, treaties are instruments of convenience — binding only so long as they serve the vital needs of a nation. The treaty, once a symbol of resilience, has now become a strategic liability, constraining India’s ability to manage its natural resources, defend its environmental security, and deter hostile provocations.

For over six decades, the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) has stood as a rare beacon of cooperation between India and Pakistan, even as blood has spilled on battlefields. But today, pressure is mounting in New Delhi to break the dam of this 1960 agreement. A recent attack in Kashmir has resulted in the suspension of the IWT for the first time. The key question: Can India legally abrogate the IWT?

A Treaty with No Exit Clause

The Treaty, signed in 1960 under World Bank mediation, divides the Indus system’s waters between the two countries, granting Pakistan control over three western rivers- Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab. In return, India retained rights over the eastern rivers- Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej, albeit with significant restrictions. The IWT’s resilience stems in part from its deliberately rigid design. It was intended as a perpetual arrangement, with no built-in exit clause for either party. The treaty explicitly states it “shall continue in force until terminated by a duly ratified treaty concluded for that purpose,” meaning it can only end if India and Pakistan both sign a new pact to replace it.

Invoking International Law: How India Could Legally Justify Abrogation

Given the IWT’s lack of an explicit exit clause, any Indian move to abrogate or modify the treaty must rest on international law, chiefly, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). India and Pakistan are not parties to the VCLT, which came into force in 1980. However, many of its provisions are considered customary international law and serve as guidance on treaty withdrawal. Article 56(1) of VCLT pertains to treaties like the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) that lack termination or withdrawal clauses. Article 56(2) requires at least 12 months’ notice before such a withdrawal takes effect. In January 2023, India formally notified Pakistan of its intention to “modify” the treaty –a diplomatic move arguably aligned with the spirit of Articles 56 and 65, signaling India’s dissatisfaction and its desire to renegotiate the terms.

Pakistan’s broader hostile conduct – outside the water-sharing framework – has effectively undermined the spirit of cooperation that underpins the treaty.

The two most relevant grounds here are “material breach” (Article 60) and “fundamental change of circumstances” (Article 62). Either could be invoked by India, albeit with significant caveats. A material breach means an outright repudiation of the treaty or violation of a provision essential to the treaty’s object and purpose. Pakistan’s broader hostile conduct – outside the water-sharing framework – has effectively undermined the spirit of cooperation that underpins the treaty.

Article 62 of the VCLT – the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus – allows a treaty to be terminated if there has been an unforeseen fundamental change in circumstances that was an essential basis of the consent to be bound by the treaty, and that radically transforms the extent of obligations still to be performed. Here, India’s case is arguably stronger on substance if framed around environmental and practical changes rather than security issues. For instance, climate change has dramatically altered the hydrological reality of the Indus Basin in ways not imagined in 1960. The IWT was negotiated under assumptions of river flow patterns and water availability that six decades of population growth and climate shifts have upended. Under Article 62, India could claim that the “essential basis” of its consent in 1960 – stable river flows and a cooperative neighbour – no longer exists.

Lessons from Global Precedents: When Treaties Are Torn Up

History offers several precedents of treaties being scrapped – legally or otherwise – when they came to be seen as untenable or one-sided. The United States attempted to withdraw from the World Health Organization (WHO) in 2020. U.S. lawyers pointed to Article 56 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)—the default rule for treaties that lack any exit clause. The 6 July 2020 notification set 6 July 2021 as the effective date—exactly the 12-month notice required by Article 56(2). Before the notice matured, President Biden (20 January 2021) formally rescinded the withdrawal. The example, therefore, shows the process in action even though the exit was ultimately reversed.

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The Baghdad Pact (1955) – a Middle East defence treaty – had no explicit exit clause, yet Iraq successfully withdrew after a revolutionary regime change. Iraq’s exit was thus completed and recognized by the depositary and other parties, reflecting a fundamental change of circumstances (new republican regime hostile to the pact) – akin to invoking VCLT Article 62 (fundamental change of circumstances) to terminate a treaty that no longer aligned with the state’s core interests.

Egypt and the Soviet Union signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1971, a 15-year pact that lacked any early withdrawal clause. In March 1976, Sadat unilaterally abrogated the 1971 treaty, ten years early, citing Soviet breaches and the radically changed strategic context. Egypt’s action exemplified reliance on VCLT principles: it invoked material breach (VCLT Article 60) – accusing the USSR of not honouring its commitments – and a fundamental change of circumstances (Article 62) in Egypt’s orientation, to justify leaving a binding treaty with no exit clause.

Diplomatic and Strategic Fallout of Abrogation

Pakistan would take India’s abrogation of the IWT to every international forum available: the United Nations, friendly capitals like Beijing and Turkey, perhaps even the International Court of Justice. While the effectiveness of such appeals is debatable (India could simply refuse to accept ICJ jurisdiction on this matter), India’s reputational costs could be significant.

Under the Realist prism, treaties are instruments of convenience — binding only so long as they serve the vital needs of a nation.

From a strategic standpoint, abrogating the IWT opens up both opportunities and risks for India. On one hand, India would gain freedom to use Indus water as it sees fit; on the other, a desperate Pakistan might decide that a water cutoff is casus belli — a cause for war, potentially triggering military confrontation. International relations are governed not by sentiment but by the cold calculus of power, survival, and national interest. Under the realist prism, treaties are instruments of convenience — binding only so long as they serve the vital needs of a nation. The treaty, once a symbol of resilience, has now become a strategic liability, constraining India’s ability to manage its natural resources, defend its environmental security, and deter hostile provocations. India can lawfully and honourably move to abrogate the Indus Waters Treaty if needed. Such a decision would not be a betrayal of order, but a reassertion of the first principle of sovereignty: that agreements are tools of peace and prosperity, not chains of strategic helplessness.

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