Operation Prosperity Guardian: West Asia in Splits

The Arab world has been witnessing exacerbating conflicts and spillovers in the region. Home to the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet, Bahrain is the only Arab state in the U.S. Naval Armada, Operation Prosperity Guardian. Both Iran and Saudi have been careful to not directly hit at each other since the restoration of their diplomatic ties. With this picture in mind, Saudi also would not want to harm the Iranian-backed Houthis. Like the Saudis, the Emiratis want to secure the Red Sea but do not want to be viewed as supporting Israel instead of solidarity with Palestine. With the nightmares of the previous Arab-Israeli wars still very much etched in the soil, the states have been trying to not escalate the tensions while trying to grapple for a balanced approach whilst also being steadfast in their solitude with Palestine.

Laden with underlying conflicts, the West Asian region has always been volatile and susceptible to more. The Israel-Palestine crisis peaked on 7 October 2023. The Iranian-backed Houthis started the Red Sea blockades in November 2023 and have pledged to continue the same until the attacks on Gaza cease. On 18 December 2023, the U.S. announced Operation Prosperity Guardian; a coalition comprising of more than 20 states to ensure freedom of navigation in the Red Sea.

Bahrain in Operation Prosperity Guardian

Home to the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet, Bahrain is the only Arab state to be part of the U.S. Naval Armada, Operation Prosperity Guardian. The island does not share a coast with the Red Sea but this does not distance it from its role in the ongoing Red Sea Crisis. This is an indirect juxtaposition to the stance taken by its neighboring states such as Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E who were also the major players in Operation Decisive Storm against the Houthis. Bahrain had also lost four of its soldiers following a Houthi drone attack on the Saudi–Yemen border on 25 September 2023.

Operation Prosperity Guardian would be under the Combined Maritime Force (CMF) and specifically under Combined Task Force 153 (CTF- 153). The CTF-153 is headquartered at the CMF in Manama, Bahrain. CTF-153 is CMF’s fourth task force, set up on 17th April 2022 to cater to the maritime security of the Red Sea as well as rendering to its capacity-building efforts. Being part of the U.S. Coalition efforts, Bahrain was the only Arab state that formally supported the U.S. and U.K. airstrikes on the Iran-backed group in January and February 2024. In addition to being identified as a major non-NATO ally by the Bush Administration in 2002, Bahrain and the U.S. also signed the Comprehensive Security Integration and Prosperity Agreement on 13 September 2023.

Being part of the U.S. Coalition efforts, Bahrain was the only Arab state that formally supported the U.S. and U.K. airstrikes on the Iran-backed group in January and February 2024.

In March 2024, Bahrain joined the Jeddah Agreement and became the only state to do so without being a member state to the initial Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC- JA). The Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC) was established in 2009. It aimed at countering piracy and ship robberies that involved the use of arms. In 2017, the scope of this was revised to curb illegal activities such as drugs and arms smuggling etc. which then came to be known as the Jeddah Amendment (DCoC- JA). In a meeting held in December 2023, the member states of the DCoC-JA adopted an eight-point action plan to counter the ongoing crisis. The points include the Development of the DCoC Information Sharing Network (ISN), DCoC Regional Maritime Security Strategy and Risk Register, increasing Coast Guard capabilities in Somalia and Yemen, etc. On 15 March 2024, the Djibouti Code of Conduct issued an “urgent appeal for enhanced international response against escalating incidents of vessel attacks in the Red Sea area and resurgence of piracy in the Western Indian Ocean.” Out of the 20 signatories to the DCoC, there are 18 member countries under the DCoC- JA.

In 2020, Bahrain signed the Abraham Accords and normalized its ties with Israel. Following the Israel-Palestine conflict escalation since 7 October 2023, the kingdom announced its recalling of the Bahraini Ambassador to Israel in the following month. Under the previous apprehensive attitude towards Iran, Bahrain would have obviously been ascertain of the Houthis to a different threat level. However, with the shift in attitude towards Iran, Bahrain might want to balance its ties in a way that won’t damage its forthcoming relations with Iran and the historic one with America. Apart from the fact that the so-called ‘Pearl of the Arabian Gulf’ hosts the U.S. Navy Base, its role has otherwise been limited in the sense that they have only provided military personnel and not any vessels.

With the shift in attitude towards Iran, Bahrain might want to balance its ties in a way that won’t damage its forthcoming relations with Iran and the historic one with America.

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Saudi’s Approach: Recalibration and Balancing

It is well known that under Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman, there has been a recalibration in Saudi Arabian Foreign Policy. He believes that it is extremely essential for Saudi to be leveraged out of its problems. Both Iran and Saudi have been careful to not directly hit at each other since the restoration of their diplomatic ties. With this picture in mind, Saudi also would not want to harm the Iranian-backed Houthis.

In 2015, Saudi Arabia supported the ruling government in Yemen and launched Operation Decisive Storm. However, following a UN- brokered ceasefire in April 2022, there has been a sharp reduction in hostilities by the parties. Peace talks are going on between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis.

Saudi has not joined Operation Prosperity Guardian. That would mean direct support to the West and Israel, something which it cannot undertake because Palestinian Statehood has always been the region’s priority although the years have witnessed varying extents of support for this by the State. For Saudi Arabia, de-escalation with the Houthis equates to their ‘own strategic interests’ despite the stakes involved. This also brings about a probable repercussion of Iran and its proxies gaining hegemony over the waterway between the Bab Al-Mandeb and Suez Canal. Over the past decade, the Red Sea has been given pivotal focus in Saudi’s Foreign Policy because of its local and regional as well as international importance. The Kingdom’s Vision 2030 encompasses ‘economic projects’ in the Red Sea. It becomes questionable, then, how much control or securitization Saudi holds over the same. Cooperation with Israel is also required for Saudi Arabia to acquire the Red Sea Islands of Tiran and Sanafir which is not possible unless both states have diplomatic ties or ‘creative legal and diplomatic solutions to try to indirectly finalize a deal.’ Saudi’s Red Sea aspirations include Neom, a floating city port, revisioning the Jeddah and Yanbu Ports, and expanding Petroline. It also has high investments in Egypt and the Horn of Africa.

Both Iran and Saudi have been careful to not directly hit at each other since the restoration of their diplomatic ties. With this picture in mind, Saudi also would not want to harm the Iranian-backed Houthis.

Riyadh assumed command of CTF Sentinel and CTF -152 in August 2023. It is also part of the Red Sea Council that was formed in 2020 which aimed at countering threats such as piracy, smuggling, etc. Other than having Red Wave, which are the Saudi Naval Exercises, the Council has not been viewed as strong enough to tackle security challenges. The State has continually condemned Israel’s attacks on Palestine. It has predominantly always been one that has wanted status-quo, being the land that hosts Islam’s holiest cities of Mecca and Medina. Often, its actions can have significant influence or consequences to its neighboring states. Also, wanting to grapple onto power as a leader of the Muslim World, Saudi must uphold its solidarity with Palestine, which holds greater repercussions if it lets go of its grip. All of this puts Saudi Arabia in a tough spot, hence, it tries to balance out its interests.

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Abu Dhabi’s Strategic Moves

U.A.E had normalized its ties with Israel under the Abrahamic Accords in 2020. Like the Saudis, the Emiratis want to secure the Red Sea but do not want to be viewed as supporting Israel instead of solidarity with Palestine. U.S. has, however, tried to portray Operation Prosperity Guardian as a means of securing international waters and trade. There is also the perception that the Emiratis along with the Saudis felt ‘shunned’ when they tried to alert the Americans regarding the Houthis when they were in conflict amongst themselves. Although the U.A.E is still a member of the Combined Maritime Force, it did announce in May 2023, that it would no longer participate in the same, due to being exhausted from the ‘ambiguity’ by the American side whenever Iranian arms or activities became a threat from a security point of view.

Like the Saudis, the Emiratis want to secure the Red Sea but do not want to be viewed as supporting Israel instead of solidarity with Palestine. Iran is also seeking to bolster its relations with U.A.E and an instance of this includes a bilateral joint economic cooperation commission in areas of economy, tourism, renewable energy etc.

Arab countries are also attempting friendlier ties with Iran and with this, obstructing American self-defense operations from their land. U.A.E has restricted the U.S. from using aircraft and drones to bomb Yemen and Iraq from the U.S. Al Dhafra Air Base. It has been reported that this is to protect itself and also because America did not hurriedly take steps to protect the State when it was attacked by the Houthis in 2022. Iran is also seeking to bolster its relations with the U.A.E and an instance of this includes a bilateral joint economic cooperation commission in areas of economy, tourism, renewable energy, etc. Abu Dhabi is also heavily invested in the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean in countering terrorism and piracy, defense cooperations, and supporting non-state actors in Sudan and Ethiopia.

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The Arab world has been witnessing exacerbating conflicts and spillovers in the region. Nine months in, the Houthi resistance continues with full resolve. With the nightmares of the previous Arab-Israeli wars still very much etched in the soil, the states have been trying to not escalate the tensions while trying to grapple for a balanced approach whilst also being steadfast in their solitude with Palestine. Since any further blowups can flare up the whole region, West Asian states find themselves treading on a tight-roped foreign policy approach.

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