For India, the elections have reinforced the rationale behind a calibrated and pragmatic approach to Myanmar that prioritizes stability, dialogue, and reducing violence over ideological positioning. New Delhi continues to engage with the authorities in Naypyidaw, not to endorse military rule, but to preserve border security, sustain humanitarian access, and maintain channels for political de-escalation.
Myanmar’s first nationwide elections since the February 2021 military coup were completed on January 25, 2026. Despite sustained insecurity and an organized boycott campaign by the National Unity Government (NUG) and its affiliated armed groups, voting took place in 265 of the country’s 330 townships. Given these constraints, the reported turnout of approximately 55% in participating constituencies is relatively high for a country affected by widespread displacement, armed violence, and political polarization. The military authorities presented the elections as a step toward restoring political order and ending open hostilities, though critics questioned their inclusiveness and intent.
Consolidation of Power
Preliminary results suggest that the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), which is closely associated with the military leadership, has won a significant number of the contested seats. Early tallies indicate that the USDP will have majorities in both chambers of parliament. Combined with the constitutionally mandated allocation of 25% of parliamentary seats to unelected military appointees, this outcome gives the military junta effective control of the legislature and forecloses the possibility of meaningful parliamentary opposition. In practical terms, the election has reinforced existing power structures, lending formal political cover to continued military authority rather than fundamentally altering the balance of power.
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The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) declined to certify or endorse the election, stating that conditions for a credible and inclusive process were absent and confirming that no ASEAN observer mission would be deployed.
Meanwhile, neighboring states with direct security and economic interests in Myanmar adopted a more pragmatic approach. China publicly welcomed the election’s completion and reiterated its support for stability and continued bilateral cooperation, framing the vote as part of a domestic political process. India had previously expressed support for Myanmar’s plan to hold elections in a “fair and inclusive” manner and sent monitoring teams. This underscores New Delhi’s prioritization of stability and sustained engagement over diplomatic isolation. Vietnam and Cambodia also sent observers, signaling a willingness among some regional actors to maintain channels of contact with Naypyidaw despite broader international skepticism. This position reflects longstanding divisions within the bloc regarding engagement with Myanmar’s post-coup authorities.
Why Myanmar’s Stability Matters to India
For India, developments in Myanmar are inextricably linked to domestic security concerns. The two countries share a 1,643-kilometer border characterized by rugged terrain. Since 2021, the conflict in Myanmar has intensified the cross-border movement of insurgents, arms, and narcotics through these weakly controlled frontier areas.
These pressures have been most visible in Mizoram and Manipur. In mid-2025, clashes between the rival Chin National Front (CNF) and the Chin Defense Force (CDF) forced up to 4,400 people to flee to Mizoram, prompting the deployment of additional police and Assam Rifles units. By that year, more than 30,000 Myanmar nationals were registered in Mizoram, with over 20,000 undergoing biometric registration. Indian law enforcement agencies also reported an increase in cross-border crime. Operations in Champhai, Saiha, and Lawngtlai districts led to the seizure of explosives, weapons, and narcotics. In September alone, the value of confiscated illegal substances exceeded $15.5 million. Further north, Manipur authorities recorded 22 drug-smuggling cases and 12 arms-trafficking cases in the first quarter alone, reflecting a broader deterioration of security along the frontier.
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The security situation is particularly consequential because conflict-affected regions, such as Sagaing and Chin, lie along the India–Myanmar–Thailand Trilateral Highway. This highway is a flagship connectivity project under India’s Act East policy. New Delhi has invested over US$250 million in the project directly and has extended more than US$1 billion in credit lines for broader ASEAN connectivity initiatives. Studies on ASEAN-India cooperation estimate that extending these corridors to Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam could generate up to $70 billion in additional regional GDP and create around 20 million jobs by the middle of the decade. India is expected to benefit from this expansion through increased trade and development in its northeast region. However, persistent insecurity in Myanmar continues to delay construction, raise costs, and cast uncertainty over the project’s long-term viability.
Elections in the Border Regions
Ahead of and during the electoral process, the junta pursued local negotiations with ethnic armed organizations to secure ceasefires or tacit non-interference, enabling limited polling, particularly in border areas. These efforts yielded mixed results. Chin State, one of the three regions bordering India, was almost entirely excluded from the electoral process because resistance forces linked to the NUG and local People’s Defense Force units retained significant territorial control there. These armed groups rejected the vote outright, preventing the establishment of conditions for polling.
In Sagaing and Kachin, the situation was similarly fragmented. Armed actors repeatedly attempted to disrupt the election by targeting logistics and security deployments. In Sagaing, 11 of the 34 townships were excluded from voting due to security concerns, and clashes were reported in seven others during the election. In Kachin State, elections could not be held in four townships, and additional incidents were recorded in two more. While areas immediately adjacent to the Indian border remained relatively calm during the initial phase, security conditions deteriorated further inland as the process continued.
Independent monitoring underscored the scale of the challenge. Myanmar Witness documented over 150 conflict-related incidents in townships that were officially designated as “active” or “stable” for voting. Insurgent groups sought to derail the process by threatening officials and voters, attacking supply routes, and otherwise intimidating civilians and local administrators.
An Unsettled Outcome
The elections highlight the ongoing nature of Myanmar’s internal conflict. Although the junta conducted polls across most accessible territory and consolidated institutional control, stability remains elusive. Efforts at negotiation were limited in scope and durability. Meanwhile, the NUG and affiliated insurgent groups invested significant resources in preventing ceasefires and disrupting electoral activity rather than facilitating political de-escalation.
For India, the elections have reinforced the rationale behind a calibrated and pragmatic approach to Myanmar that prioritizes stability, dialogue, and reducing violence over ideological positioning. New Delhi continues to engage with the authorities in Naypyidaw, not to endorse military rule, but to preserve border security, sustain humanitarian access, and maintain channels for political de-escalation. This stance contrasts with that of several ASEAN members, whose refusal to engage with the junta has allowed opposition forces to reject ceasefires and disrupt electoral and administrative processes through armed conflict.
India’s policy reflects the recognition that sustained instability in Myanmar has tangible regional costs and that isolating the authorities without offering workable political solutions risks prolonging the conflict. By maintaining engagement while consistently calling for inclusive dialogue and restraint, New Delhi has sought to balance its own security interests with support for peaceful initiatives, positioning itself as a regional actor focused on achieving practical outcomes.
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References
2. https://www.nationthailand.com/blogs/news/asean/40061792
11. https://www.foreigntradejournal.com/article/view/146/7-1-11
About the author
Vijay Kumar Dhar is a political and economic analyst and freelance journalist. His works are focused on actual political events and their influence on India and Indo-Pacific geopolitics.
